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Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy 
Brian Bix 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, 221 pp. 
Reviewed by Russell Jacksont 
As the preeminent means by which we bring concepts such as law 
into the material world, language can be the first thing seized upon 
to explain why interpretations of law may vary from person to per-
son. In a densely-packed, yet subtle book, comprehensively entitled 
Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy, University of London lec-
turer Brian Bix warns legal theorists of all levels that although lan-
guage may represent the sole method of presenting law, that does 
not mean that language is the sole, or even the most important, fac-
tor in understanding it. 
Bix addresses the complex theme of legal determinacy, and 
language's role in it, against a backdrop of Wittgenstein's language 
philosophies. Taking three representative approaches to the law, 
H. L.A. Hart's idea of open texture, Ronald Dworkin's interpretive 
theory, and Michael Moore's metaphysical realism, Bix methodi-
cally assesses how each accounts for the derivation of meaning from 
language-comprised law. 
First establishing a linguistic basis from which to proceed, Bix 
then analyzes Hart's open texture theory, both on its own terms and 
in relation to earlier and more fundamental theories of the same 
name propounded by Wittgenstein and his interpreter Friedrich 
Waismann. Hart claims that any rule encompasses a "fringe of 
vagueness" outside of its obvious application: does a ban on vehicles 
in a park include roller skates, for example? 
Bix believes that this theory essentially forms an empirical 
rationale for judicial discretion. Bix feels that this does justice to 
Hart's version of open texture because it helps to identify the 
limitation of language when it comes to constructing exhaustive 
rules. But just as importantly, Bix reigns in Hart's theory to prevent 
the potential confusion between what Hart meant by open texture, 
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and what Waismann and Wittgenstein referred to when they used the 
same phrase. 
The possibility for confusion is increased by the shared use of 
the term "foreseeability." But while Hart examines a rule's interpre-
tation of an event that the rule did not foresee and that falls on the 
edge of its obvious reference, Waismann and Wittgenstein enter-
tained a more extreme experiment. They contemplated the effect 
that an unforeseeable shift in referential reality itself would have on 
the efficacy of conversational language. 
It is clear, therefore, that Hart's and Wittgenstein's nominally 
identical theories actually investigate significantly different notions 
of language (rule vs. commonplace speech, respectively), as well as 
significantly different types of unforeseeable effects that could 
strain the meaning of language. Hart's use of the terms to study 
problems of questionable applicability represents a far narrower re-
sult than the limits of semantic intelligibility that concerned 
Wittgenstein. Bix sets out for the reader Hart's specific contribution 
and Wittgenstein's more fundamental language theories. Bix thus 
provides a creditable standard by which to measure the often 
grandiose claims for language of Hart, Dworkin, and Moore. In 
fact, Bix contends that legal theorists tend to "find more in 
Wittgenstein than is actually there."1 Particularly, and not surpris-
ingly, this applies to Wittgenstein's rule-following theories, which, 
as the name portends, would hold special appeal for legal scholars. 
Contrary to the language-definitive theories of Hart, Dworkin, 
and Moore, however, Wittgenstein did not postulate that language 
contains any inherent compulsive power. Rather, Bix contends, he 
went precisely the opposite way, downplaying the significance of 
language's unique nature in any conclusion about how rules are un-
derstood and followed. Instead, Wittgenstein tied the issue of lan-
guage's compulsive power in with his views on the general nature of 
language. He realized that meaning depends on the "determinacy of 
the descriptive term";2 which is the collective force with which a 
society imbues that term. This, in turn, is a culmination of many 
factors, and Wittgenstein maintained that a "consensus in applying 
such terms is due to some combination of our common human na-
1 B. Bix, Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993) at 
61-62. 
2 Supra note 1 at 62. 
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ture, our common training and our common way of life."3 
Wittgenstein's seminal philosophy reasonably steps back from la-
belling any single factor, including language, the determinative in-
fluence on meaning. Bix juxtaposes this position against the legal 
theories that inflate language's role, suggesting that such theorists 
have pursued language with more exuberance than insight. 
If anything, this identifies a central weakness of the book, in that 
this underlying thesis is not identified at the beginning. If Bix had 
clearly stated at the outset that he intended to demonstrate that 
legal theorists have approached language with a misguided 
methodology, he would have given substance to what initially seems 
an unsatisfying effort, for Bix consistently reveals the inadequacy of 
successive language-oriented theories, but confirms nothing in their 
stead. As Bix's arguments unfold, an implicit theme that legal 
theorists have made too much of language's role in legal 
determinacy becomes apparent. His point is valid and timely, but 
it could have been made much more strongly if explicitly 
identified in the introduction. 
From Hart, who fixes meaning on the words used, Bix moves to 
analyze Dworkin's interpretive doctrine, which places the onus of 
discovering legal meaning on the judges who interpret those words. 
Dworkin contends that all legal conflicts contain their own proper 
solution which must be divined by the arbitrator. Bix criticizes 
Dworkin' s main contention in illuminating ways. For example, he 
corrects Dworkin' s inversion of the cause and effect properties of 
language using Darwinian evolutionary arguments. 
Bix refutes Dworkin's theory point-by-point, but discusses 
Moore's metaphysical realism more broadly. While Hart proposed 
that rules could be inherently peremptory, and Dworkin stressed a 
judge's responsibility to discern the true implication of the law's 
language, Moore questioned the very connection between language 
and concept that makes language relevant at all. 
Metaphysical realism posits that legal concepts occupy a kind 
of quasi-Platonic position of permanence that the words of a law can 
only approximate. This represents a rudimentary linguistic truism 
regarding semantic flexibility and, while it bears keeping in mind, 
Bix says that it is not something on which to base a whole theory of 
legal determinacy. More significantly, Bix sees in metaphysical 
realism the same failing he sees in Hart's and Dworkin' s theories. 
3 Ibid. 
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They extrapolate into an entire theory about understanding law 
merely one aspect of the whole, much more complex, process. 
The connection between law and language is indisputable, Hart, 
Dworkin, and Moore are seduced by this fact and each attempt to 
build, with this idea as its starting point, a comprehensive theory of 
how we derive meaning from law. Bix assesses each of these theories 
in turn and demonstrates how they fundamentally overstate the role 
of language in law. 
Squeezing into two hundred concise pages a comparative study 
of three major legal theories, selections from a language philosophy 
and a host of subordinate doctrines, Bix assumes in the reader a 
substantial working knowledge of the theories critiqued. While his 
analysis is incisive and succinct, it makes the book a tough first ven-
ture into jurisprudence. 
